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Reward Structures and 
Organizational Design 




This article is concerned with the issues of motivation and control of 
nursing home personnel to increase their responsiveness to the needs of 
the elderly. The perspective taken is one of organizational analysis and, 
specifically, a consideration of the functions and dysfunctions of 
particular reward structures. The reward structures analyzed are (1) 
reimbursement schemes for homes in relation to the performance of 
home administrators and (2) supervisory arrangements for personal 
care workers in regard to the delivery of nonroutine services to patients. 
We point out some of the difficulties inherent in existing organizational 
structures and suggest modifications to increase the influence of patients 
and their relatives. 
The configuration of rewards is one of the two mechanisms by 
which performance is motivated and controlled in formal organi-
zations, the second of the mechanisms being the socialization 
process. By "reward structure" we mean the array of inducements 
and punishments associated with different levels of performance. 
By "socialization" we refer to the internalization of values 
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concerning what constitutes suitable role behavior. In this article 
we shall use the concept of reward structure as an integrating 
theme; several features and problems of nursing homes will be 
outlined in reference to this framework. 
Sociologists commonly investigate how the characteristics of 
individuals influence performance with respect to the operation 
of a particular reward structure. For example, there have been 
many studies of educational achievement, the rewards in this 
instance being class grades. Some of the factors found to 
differentiate among students are IQ, race, parental socioeco-
nomic status, and parental values (Hauser, 1971; Coleman, 1966). 
There also have been numerous studies of attainment within work 
organizations; here the relevant rewards are occupational status 
and earnings. The basic finding is that family background, 
educational attainment, sex, and race make a substantial contribu-
tion to explaining individual differences in occupational achieve-
ment (Blau and Duncan, 1967; Jencks, 1972). 
Less attention has been given to the subject of how to structure 
rewards in a particular institution in order to motivate perfor-
mance. We have ample evidence that features of the reward 
scheme are consequential for individual behavior. For example, 
students appear to learn more when letter grades are awarded 
than when a pass-fail system is used (Gage and Berliner, 1975: 
341-342). Similarly, there have been investigations of attainment 
in the classroom when concrete, rather than symbolic, induce-
ments are offered (e.g., monetary reinforcement instead of 
grades) and when group performance, rather than individual 
merit, is reinforced (Spilerman, 1971: Johnson and Johnson, 
1974; Michaels, 1977; Slavin, 1977; Slavin and Tanner, 1979). We 
learn from this literature, for instance, that concrete inducements 
are more effective than symbolic rewards at an early age and for 
lower-class and minority youth-in short, for students who have 
not internalized the value of education. Where internalization has 
taken, symbolic rewards appear to provide adequate motivation. 
Different kinds of reward structures are also used by work 
organizations. Firms may remunerate employees on the basis of a 
piece rate, an hourly wage, or a weekly salary, the choice 
depending on the type of product and the style of supervision. 
Still different reward structures, such as the Scanlan plan (Brown, 
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1965}, provide a bonus for group productivity. It is recognized 
that these different reward structures sensitize employees to 
particular facets of their work roles. Piecework is the extreme 
case of reward for uncoordinated effort (though, as we have 
learned from the Bank Wiring Room study [Roethlisberger and 
Dixon, 1940; Homans, 1950], informal peer pressure may 
operate to reduce the variation in individual productivity that 
would exist among isolated workers). In contrast, group-based 
payment plans ensure a maximum amount of cooperation and 
are effective schemes when coordination is required. 
Where tasks are complex, an appropriately designed reward 
structure will be multifaceted. For example, it is not unusual for a 
worker's wage rate or promotion prospects to reflect his individ-
ual performance while, at the same time, bonuses are offered to 
the work group for high productivity of completed units-a task 
that may require coordination. To incorporate a firm's concern 
about work quality, the remuneration plan might count defective 
units against the group's bonus. 
It is also recognized that a reward structure can be ill-designed. 
A common example concerns the tendency in some organizations 
to reify "procedure" when deviations from the rules are necessary 
for goal attainment (Davis, 1948). Individuals go by the book, in 
this circumstance, not because they are psychologically compul-
sive, but because the reward structure is more sensitive to means 
than to achievement. Initiative is suppressed and "ritualistic 
behavior" replaces "goal orientation," to use Robert Merton's 
(1957: 131-150, 195-202) terms. 
Another way in which a reward structure can be poorly 
designed is if it is not adequately sensitive to relevant constituen-
cies. For instance, governmental agencies intended to serve the 
public sometimes are unresponsive to client needs (see, e.g., 
Blau's, 1960, analysis of welfare departments). What can be 
responsible is an arrangement whereby clients have little power in 
their dealings with staff because client satisfaction is not conse-
quential for the careers of the workers. In contrast, in the private 
sector, customer treatment usually is superior. Since customers 
can take their business elsewhere, a decrease in patronization 
constitutes feedback to a firm that something is amiss. If the 
problem is correctly diagnosed, staff rewards will be adjusted to 
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reflect perceived relations with customers. In short, the adaptive 
mechanism within firms in a competitive economy recognizes 
that customers have power and the reward structure of employees 
is organized to reflect this fact. 
The above comments are intended to convey the meaning of 
reward structure, the importance of this concept, the fact that 
different designs can exist for a given institution, and the point 
that a reward structure can be sensitive to certain aspects of 
organizational operation-or to certain constituencies-but can 
ignore others. To complete this discussion, we point out that in a 
total institution (one in which individuals reside involuntarily and 
have little control over the elements of their lives), the significance 
of the reward structure is magnified, since there can be neither 
withdrawal from the facility nor appeal from its internal arrange-
ments (Etzioni, 1961: 160-174). Where the preferences and 
dissatisfactions of residents can be ignored, these persons are 
effectively powerless. The pathological forms of behavior that 
arise in this setting (infantilism, identification with aggressors) 
are well-documented (Bettleheim, 1943, 1967: 63-68). 
A second integrating theme of this article concerns the tension 
between the dual goals of efficiency and responsiveness. In a 
nursing home, efficiency is promoted by routinization of care and 
by the creation of categories of patients, so that specialized mixes 
of services can be tailored to homogeneous groups of residents. 
With respect to routinization, a major difficulty is that many 
personal needs of patients cannot be scheduled, and attempts by a 
home to impose such an order tend to be burdensome for the 
residents. With regard to categorization, which is accomplished 
according to disability level, this attribute is not stable, so that the 
maintenance of relatively homogeneous nursing care categories 
entails the shifting of residents between wards and institutions. 
Thus, the strategies which are normally applied to obtain 
efficiencies in a work organization can, in a nursing home, 
undermine the quality of personal and social life. 
In the next section we describe state reimbursement schedules 
for nursing home expenses and the implications of the reimburse-
ment scheme for patient welfare. Following these comments, we 
turn to the matter of relations between nursing home personnel 
and residents and inquire into the consequence of particular 
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supervisory patterns for the quality of the interactions. In those 
two sections the underlying theoretical theme emphasizes the 
structure of rewards and the dysfunctions of particular existing 
arrangements. In the third section we shift to a consideration of 
efficiency and responsiveness from the perspective of organiza-
tional structure and organizational design. 
As a final note, we point out that a principal source of 
information about the daily operation of old age and nursing 
homes was our own unsystematic observation over several years 
in four highly regarded institutions. Our presence was as relatives 
of patients and our attentions were directed toward their needs, 
not to comprehensive data gathering with pretested instruments. 
Yet, this sort of involvement exposes one to rather subtle aspects 
of decision making in the homes and to the nature of interactions 
between staff and patients. Our confidence in these observations 
is heightened by the fact that, independently, we reached many of 
the same conclusions. 
Reimbursement Policy and 
Nursing Home Adaptations 
ALTERNA TIVE REIMBURSEMENT SCHEMES 
Reimbursement policies for hospitals commonly follow a fee-
for-service arrangement. Charges to a patient or a third-party 
provider reflect the cost of diagnostic tests, treatment, drugs, and 
other services provided to the individual. To be precise, there 
usually is a fixed charge for room, food, and routine nursing care, 
which varies only according to the type of room accommodation 
(e.g., private or semiprivate). The cost of supplementary proce-
dures is added to the basic bill. 
One exception to this arrangement is that the daily rate in the 
intensive care ward is higher than the rate charged in other 
hospital units. Thus, we can view a medical facility as containing 
two (or more) categories of patients, with different daily rates for 
each. All patients within a category are billed the same fee, aside 
from charges for individual medical procedures. The latter, 
however, constitute a substantial portion of a patient's bill; 
indeed, often this is the larger amount. 
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Nursing homes for the elderly and old age homes tend to follow 
different reimbursement models. The majority of old age homes 
receive payments directly from residents or their families, not 
from third-party providers. Retirement homes, consequently, are 
able to organize their charges in a variety of ways and appear to 
respond to the market with regard to fees billed and services 
provided. Nonetheless, most operate as sheltered hotels of one 
sort or another and charge a fixed montly amount which covers 
room, food, and ancillary services such as entertainment. Like a 
hospital's daily rate, the amount is usually a function only of 
room choice. Unlike a hospital, there is little variation among 
residents in the cost of their care and hence no need for 
supplementary charges. 
Nursing homes operate within a more constrained reimburse-
ment environment. For most homes, the major source of income 
is third-party payments, especially Medicaid, and nursing homes 
therefore operate in accordance with regulations that qualify 
them to receive these reimbursements. Although the governing 
provisions are state rules, because the source of the funds is 
federal moneys, the regulations vary little from state to state in 
many essential respects. Congress requires each state to reim-
burse nursing facilities on a "reasonable cost-related basis." 
Federal legislation is also responsible for the creation of two 
categories of nursing home patients, "intermediate care" and 
"skilled nursing care." 
The logic behind establishing levels is to promote efficiency by 
permitting different bundles of services to be provided to each 
group. The distinction between the two categories involves, more 
or less, a consideration of whether a patient is ambulatory, alert, 
and needs only minor assistance in dressing and washing or 
whether a higher level of care is required. In most states, like 
a hospital's basic room charge, the fee to a resident-or to a third-
party provider-is the same for all patients in a category. Unlike 
hospitals, this fee is the principal charge levied by a nursing home 
for its services, irrespective of the needs of a particular patient. 
States do differ in details of the reimbursement scheme. Some 
employ a system in which the fixed amount charged for each 
patient in a category is established prospectively, at the beginning 
of a billing period. Others compute payments retrospectively, on 
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the basis of actual allowable costs. Most states have adopted 
"facility-related" reimbursment plans, in which state payments 
are based on the costs incurred by the particular home. However, 
a few (e.g., Illinois) use "facility independent" reimbursement 
schemes, in which payments are tied to patient characteristics and 
to the services offered by the home (Holahan et al. 1977: 106-113). 
A very few (e.g., California) use versions of "flat-rate" reimburse-
ment, in which the payment is identical for all patients in a 
category in every nursing home in the state (Spitz and Weeks, 
1980a: 28). Nevertheless, because all states set maximums on the 
per-diem charges they will accept, the opportunity to recover high 
expenses-even when properly incurred-is limited under any of 
the arrangements. 
NURSING HOME RESPONSES TO THE 
REIMBURSEMENT STRUCTURE 
The reimbursement schemes under which most homes operate 
were designed with the objective of controlling costs, especially 
costs billed to third-party programs. Nursing homes have some 
discretion concerning how they choose to limit costs, though they 
must meet state licensing standards in regard to details of the 
physical facility, food quality, availability of registered nurses, 
doctors, and the like. 
The criteria that homes must meet are, effectively, features of 
the reimbursement structure that cannot be ignored by home 
administrators. Existence of a minimum standard for licensing 
establishes threshold adaptation behavior for a profit maximizer: 
Do enough to safely exceed the mandated minimum, but no more 
than necessary. Some states (e.g., Connecticut and Illinois) have 
complex reimbursement formulas, which depend on home qual-
ity. In Connecticut, institutions are graded A, B, C, and so on in 
accordance with a variety of phsysical and service characteris-
tics, and the per-diem reimbursement rate increases with a home's 
quality score (Moss and Halamandoris, 1977: 142). This arrange-
ment constitutes a prescription for a nursing home administrator 
regarding the improvements he might make in order to increase 
income. More important, schemes of this sort also designate-by 
omission-the features of homes and the array of potential 
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services that will not enter into the reimbursement calculations. 
The criteria that receive weight in the evaluation of a home for 
licensing, or in the determination of its reimbursement rate, have 
characteristics of being (1) quantifiable and (2) health related, 
rather than "quality of life" indices. Quantifiable standards are 
preferred because they usually are objective, unambiguous, and 
replicable. Health-related criteria are emphasized because the 
nursing home, as a social institution, has been viewed more as an 
adjunct of a hospital than of an old age home (Kane and Kane, 
1978). Also, while the efficacy of health-related regulations for 
patient well-being can be documented, this is more difficult to 
accomplish with "quality of Hfe" programs. Thus, nursing homes 
are likely to have requirements about nutrition, room tempera-
ture, and bathing of patients, but not about the provision of social 
or recreational activities. Because administrators respond to the 
inducements of this reward structure, one often finds the physical 
needs of patients adequately cared for, but in an environment that 
is sterile-socially, intellectually, and emotionally. 
The different reimbursement schemes we have enumerated 
provide inducements for particular sorts of dysfunctional adapta-
tions. As a general statement,facility independent reimbursement 
encourages threshold mentality among administrators: On each 
activity covered by the state, spend enough to ensure home 
accreditation for the activity but no more, since actual costs do 
not enter into the reimbursement formula. Where homes are paid 
on the basis of a patient's assessed level of disability (e.g., Illinois), 
there is little incentive for encouraging patient improvement since 
this would reduce income. Flat rate reimbursement is even more 
pernicious from the point of view of patient welfare: Each dollar 
spent on a patient comes out of the home's potential profit 
(Vladeck, 1980: 83-86). 
Facility dependent reimbursement carries little motivation to 
control costs because these can be passed on to the state. 
However, this is really a theoretical assessment, since in practice 
all states have a cap on the expenses they will reimburse. I Further, 
states using a facility dependent scheme have been moving toward 
prospective determination of the rate as a way to control costs. 
Like flat-rate reimbursement, this creates a zero-sum relationship 
between a home and its patients: Once the rate has be~n set for a 
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year, each dollar saved can be retained by the home. Thus, an 
incentive is created to reduce expenditures, possibly to the 
detriment of patient care. 
Facility dependent reimbursement with prospective determi-
nation of the rates is the most widely used arrangement. Where we 
do not note otherwise, we will be commenting on this reimburse-
ment structure. We wish now to describe a couple of concrete 
adaptations which are rational for nursing homes to make and 
which, from informal discussions with staff, we believe they do 
make. We point out that our comments are based on observations 
in a few homes, though we suspect that the adaptations are fairly 
common (see, e.g., Spitz and Weeks, 1980b: 46; Dunlop, 1979: 
89). 
Admission Decisions. If patients are divided into two categor-
ies-intermediate care and skilled nursing care-and if the per-
diem rate is the same for all patients in a category, then, on 
economic grounds, nursing homes should prefer the less infirm 
applicants from among those who qualify for a particular level of 
care category. While the degree of a patient's disability affects the 
amount of assistance and the resources he will require from the 
home, the per-diem billing structure is not sensitive to this 
consideration once the rate is set for the year. Such calculations 
may not be pertinent to homes with many vacant beds. However, 
the better institutions have waiting lists and are tempted to make 
cruel distinctions among the elderly, in which those with the 
greatest needs are disadvantaged in their quest for entrance. 
Who shall live? Nursing homes for the elderly often are 
terminal residences for this popUlation. The length of stay tends 
to be long, in comparison with hospitals; in 1973, for example, the 
average stay in a Medicaid-certified skilled nursing facility was 20 
months (Kane and Kane, 1978: 914). Among the elderly, the final 
years of life are accompanied by strokes and progressively 
incapacitating infirmities. As a result, the admission decisions of 
homes usually bear relevance for the level of patient needs and 
patient costs only during the initial months of a stay. 
In a nursing home, then, patients soon come to differ greatly in 
the amount of resources they require in order to be sustained. In a 
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skilled care unit, the range of infirmity can vary from individuals 
who need only to be assisted from bed and dressed but are mobile 
with the aid of a cane or walker to patients who are paralyzed and 
require extensive assistance. There may also be language impair-
ments which slow communication with a nurse or orderly, 
thereby requiring more staff time. 
It is our view that administrators of nursing homes, at least 
implicitly, utilize a form of triage in allocating institutional 
resources. One group of patients is "profit making" from a home's 
point of view, in that they require less staff time and fewer 
resources than the funds they bring into the home through the 
fixed per-diem reimbursement. A second group requires re-
sources in an amount roughly commensurate with the funds they 
bring to the home; the institution "breaks even" in providing for 
their needs. Finally, because of the range of patient infirmities 
within a single reimbursement category such as skilled nursing, 
there are individuals who require attention and resources in 
excess of the income they generate. 
Now, the fact that, from time to time, a resident may require 
large expenditures by a home for brief durations-such as when 
one becomes ill with an infection-is unimportant with respect to 
the commitment of the home to maintain him. Rather, it is the 
patient who chronically requires a large outlay of nursing time, 
such as a paralyzed person, who is a threat to the economic 
viability of a home. Proper care may necessitate feeding, washing, 
turning each hour to avoid bedsores, and frequent changing of 
bedsheets. The high expense of nursing care for such an 
individual cannot be recovered under a reimbursement structure 
which is insensitive to patient differences in the cost of mainte-
nance. 
The adaptation which we believe occurs is that the resources 
required by these patients in order to survive in modest comfort 
and health are often denied to them. We are not alluding to the 
decisions of insensitive owners of profit-making homes, the 
scandals which have appalled us in recent years. Indeed, we 
suggest that in the best institutions, out of concern for the welfare 
of all residents, administrators limit the resources they permit to 
be spent on a chronically infirm person. The rationale is a 
humanitarian one: Resources expended on one patient are not 
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available for others. At stake is not a simple moral decision of 
whether to meet an invalid's many needs versus maximizing the 
return on a financial investment, but a question of balancing the 
competing requirements of many elderly persons who must be 
maintained on a fixed budget. The result is cruel, as adminis-
trators invariably opt to care for the many, with the result that 
paralyzed though alert patients have to wait intervals for 
assistance which exceed their endurance.2 The psychological and 
physical deterioration caused by this neglect is extensive. 
One way in which administrators implement their decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources among patients is by 
assigning a fixed number of personnel to each ward, with 
responsibility for all patients in the jurisdiction. Incapacitated 
persons may receive more staff time than other residents, but 
usually not an amount commensurate with their needs. Just as a 
home administrator must make a decision about distributing the 
institution's limited resources among patient wards (which he 
makes, in part, through staff assignments), service personnel need 
to decide how to allot their scarce time among the assigned 
residents. To emphasize the difference with a hospital, the 
recourse of adding staff to care for patients with severe incapaci-
ties is not an option chosen by a nursing home when these 
expenses cannot be recovered. 
A related issue concerns the provision of medical treatment in 
cases of acute illness. Small nursing homes do not employ a 
medical staff; rather, a patient's own physician visits the institu-
tion in times of sickness. A question can arise concerning when to 
transfer a resident to a hospital. A home's interest in this matter is 
that, in several states (e.g., New Jersey), reimbursement stops 
once a bed is vacated and it can be several days until a new 
resident is admitted. Where a physician obtains referrals from 
nursing home administrators, he may in turn respond to the 
home's preference regarding transfers, except for the most serious 
of illnesses. 
Large homes often employ full-time physicians. This ensures 
the ready availability of medical personnel, but it also carries a 
potential for conflicts of responsibility. As an employee, a staff 
phsyician must be sensitive to the home's wishes on medical-
related matters. Moreover, staff physicians often are foreign 
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nationals or immigrants, without a realistic option to enter 
private practice; this structural position serves to further under-
mine their professional autonomy. 
To limit costs, homes may discourage physicians from pre-
scribing procedures that entail intensive nursing, to the detriment 
of an ill resident. Also, even with physicians on staff, a nursing 
home has a limited capability for treating severe illness. (They 
may not have the facility, for example, to do IV's or monitor a 
heart's rhythm.) Yet, aside from a home's interest in avoiding 
empty beds, hospital transfers are inhibited by the fact that the 
justification to the state for employing physicians may involve an 
understanding that many illnesses, which otherwise would re-
quire a hospital stay, could be treated locally. These comments 
pertain to the care of any acutely ill resident but they are 
especially relevant to severely incapacitated patients, for whom a 
decision to trate aggressively or not carries implications for the 
long-term financial situation of a home. 
These considerations lead to the topic of how to organize 
nursing homes so that they will be economically efficient and 
responsive to a patient population with a variety of needs. From 
what we have indicated, residents who have severe infirmities 
suffer acutely under the present reimbursement arrangement. 
One approach would be to devise entirely new reward structures. 
An interesting recent proposal (Kane and Kane, 1978) would 
have homes reimbursed according to the time course of a pRtient's 
level of functioning, in relation to his prognosis at the time of 
entry into the institution. This scheme has the advantage of 
eliminating the incentive to skim healthier individuals from the 
applicant pool. It also would associate the payments that are 
received by a home with patient welfare. 
Yet, there are practical difficulties with a reimbursement 
structure of this sort. It would place a heavy responsibility on 
obtaining accurate assessments of patient functioning at the time 
of entry into the institution and at subsequent time points. 
Because of day-to-day fluctuations in the condition of elderly 
persons, mUltiple observations would be required at each assess-
ment to construct reliable evaluations. It also would be necessary 
to devise a measurement instrument that is replicable across 
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investigators because the same specialist might not be available to 
examine a patient at each follow-up. Adding to these problems is 
the necessity for having the evaluations performed by specialists 
who are independent of the nursing home, since financial 
payments to the institution would be at stake. Still further 
difficulties involve the construction of accurate forecasts of 
individual functioning and the factoring into the reimbursement 
model of adjustments for unpredictable events-strokes, broken 
hips, and so on. In short, the complications associated with 
managing this reward structure would be immense. 
A less ambitious approach would be to tinker with existing 
reimbursement plans, making modifications once information 
has accumulated concerning specific dysfunctions. For example, 
even with the structures currently in use, homes could be made 
more responsive to patient needs by creating additional resident 
categories, each dedicated to a particular type of infirmity or level 
of care, and each having a reimbursement rate appropriate to the 
cost of its services. A very different sort of strategy is based on the 
recognition that no simple reimbursement plan is likely to be 
devised for a complex institution, such as a nursing home, 
without incentives being present for some kinds of undesired 
adaptations. Following this reasoning, a recommended course 
would be to supplement the control functions of the reimburse-
ment structure with monitoring programs and feedback channels 
to concerned constituencies, who might intervene to safeguard 
patient interests. Ombudsmen and relatives' associations can play 
important roles of this nature. These options are outlined and 
appraised in the next sections, in connection with other nursing 
home issues. 
Interactions Between Staff and Patients 
THE STRUCTURAL CONTEXT 
The staff we are concerned with here are the workers who have 
greatest impact on the day-to-day affairs of residents-nurses' 
aides and orderlies. One must first appreciate what their work is 
like. It consists of feeding patients, turning and washing them, 
56 I RESEARCH ON AGING 
inserting bed pans, cleaning bed pans, and helping patients to the 
bathroom and wiping them. One must next understand who the 
workers are. Because of the nature of the task and the fact that the 
jobs are "dead end," the workers tend to be individuals with little 
education and low motivation. In large cities, they often are 
ethnically and racially different from the residents; in New Y or k 
City, for example, the lower level staff are, predominantly, black 
and Spanish-speaking, while the residents are middle-class 
individuals of Jewish, Italian, or Irish descent. 
Finally, one must recognize that the conditions of most 
patients make interaction with staff-especially expressive inter-
action-exceedingly difficult. Many elderly persons have speech 
or hearing impairments, as a result of stroke or degenerative 
illness. Others are marked by some degree of senility. These 
maladies coupled with the fact of class, ethnic, and sometimes 
language differences virtually eliminate the possibility of empa-
thy, affection, and personal consideration emerging in the 
relations between patients and workers. 3 This social gap is 
consequential because, in a context of minimum staff socializa-
tion to notions of societal responsibility for the elderly, an 
absence of personal bonds to moderate staff behavior means that 
the only mechanism available to administrators for influencing 
performance is the reward structure. It is our contention that the 
reward structures currently in effect do not adequately motivate 
or control staff behavior. 
It still remains to point out the enormous importance of lower 
level staff for patient welfare. Doctors and nurses may visit 
patients intermittently, but they do not respond to the hourly 
needs of the residents. Patients are dependent upon aides and 
orderlies for assistance with the everyday tasks which make 
existence possible. How the assistance is provided determines 
whether or not an infirm person can live in modest comfort with 
some control over his immediate environment. This dependency 
translates into staff power. A patient who is viewed as trouble-
some may have to wait a long time for service. Since the degree of 
control over bodily functions is limited in this population, a 10-
minute wait can be beyond endurance. Because there are no 
alternate suppliers of these services in a nursing home and 
because patients reside there continuously, rather than for part of 
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each day, nursing homes are effectively "total institutions" 
(Etzioni, 196 I: 160- I 74); in an organizational sense they share 
important features in common with prisons and concentration 
camps. In each setting, residents are dependent upon staff for the 
essentials of their existence, powerless in their dealings with staff, 
and unable to withdraw from the institution. 
Low-level workers have enormous power over resident com-
fort for several reasons. First, the staff are overworked and 
competing requests frequently are made for their time. As a 
result, failures in responding to a patient can be explained to a 
supervisor in terms of the concurrent needs of other residents. 
Second, complaints are often discounted, attributed to senility or 
to diffuse patient anger at their own physical incapacities, which 
is displaced upon staff. Third, many patients have little sense of 
time and do confuse a 5-minute wait with a 20-minute delay. This 
situation is exploited by service workers, who explain genuine 
complaints in terms of patient disorientation. Lower level staff 
are especially powerful during the night shift, when few super-
visors and no relatives are present. Finally, where the staff is 
unionized, it is difficult to discipline a worker in response to 
patient complaints unless physical abuse is evident. Disciplinary 
hearings involve a fact-finding procedure and, because of the 
mental haziness of many patients, their testimony is suspect. 
Staff use their discretionary power to acquaint patients with 
proper behavior (from the workers' perspective), to reduce 
patient expectations and thereby limit the demands for staff time. 
When a new resident arrives at a nursing home, relatives are 
discouraged by low-level workers from visiting frequently, even 
though the home's announced policy may encourage such visits. 
In a manner reminiscent of children arriving at summer camp, 
relatives are told that new patients resist adjusting to institutional 
life, that frequent visits by relatives inhibit a patient's interest in 
befriending other residents and slow his acclimation to the home 
and its activities. There is merit to these remarks, but they are also 
self-serving: It is in the interests of staff that new patients be 
taught to accept long waits for service. They must be introduced 
to the power of workers to discipline, to respond to or ignore 
requests, and must learn that complaining to a supervisor is of no 
avail. 
58 I RESEARCH ON AGING 
The reaction of new patients who are mentally alert is one of 
frustration, anger, and protest at this loss of control over the 
elements of their existence. In the initial weeks of stay, relatives 
are a problem for staff, since new patients may request concerned 
relatives to intervene and, unlike residents, relatives are not 
powerless. However, if frequent visits can be discouraged during 
the adjustment period, a new patient's expectations can be altered 
and brought into line with the facts of life in the home. In a total 
institution, the impact of behavioral modification is enormous 
and few insist for long on their abstract rights. 
When a patient is not severely impaired, staff socialization can 
make him self-reliant, since worker interests are not directed to 
limit a patient's activities but to reduce the demands made upon 
themselves. However, when a patient does require considerable 
assistance, the socialization process tends to leave him depressed 
and demoralized, because his dependence upon staff convenience 
and schedules is made evident. A resident who cannot control his 
bodily functions will hear comments such as, "You just had the 
bed pan, you must wait a half hour" and "even though your bed is 
wet, I don't change linen until 2 p.m." Socialization makes the 
impaired patient compliant with such directives, but the adjust-
ment can be devastating to his or her self-esteem. It is not 
uncommon for the range of interests of an alert and sophisticated 
individual, in this situation, to become constricted and focused on 
concerns about meeting toilet schedules. 
MODIFICATIONS OF THE REWARD STRUCTURE 
AND OTHER OPTIONS 
The problem we have delineated arises from the concentration 
of power over patient welfare in the hands of low-level staff-
hardly the most qualified of individuals-and the absence of 
countervailing controls to protect patients from neglect or abuse 
by the workers. All remedies of this situation involve a rebalanc-
ing of the power relationship, giving patients or their guardians 
an opportunity to evaluate staff actions and provide effective 
inputs to their reward structure. 
A direct approach to strengthening the hand of residents would 
be to have home administrators collect from them ratings of the 
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performance of each worker. This is feasible, since the patients 
would not be evaluating staff in terms of technical expertise but in 
terms of courtesy and responsiveness. A question can be raised 
with respect to the interests of nonalert patients, who could not 
participate in an evaluation. Yet, the problem of staff perfor-
mance, and their responsiveness to requests for nonroutine 
service, is mainly a concern of alert residents. N onalert patients 
would continue to be served by the routine procedures mandated 
by the home. A more serious difficulty stems from the fact that 
residents cannot be neatly divided into alert and nonalert 
categories; many even vary from day to day in degree of mental 
clarity. For this reason, reliance could not be placed on the ratings 
by any single patient. However, where there is consistency in the 
evaluations of a worker, the result would carry greater reliability. 
Even more consequential than an analysis of the ratings would be 
the act of collecting such information. We suggest that once the 
staff recognize that residents will be queried periodically about 
worker responsiveness, this fact itself would moderate their 
behavior.4 
Most homes forbid tipping. This prohibition is a testament to 
the effectiveness of tipping in influencing staff activity. A relative 
can obtain remarkably considerate service for a resident by 
passing a few dollars to an aide and letting him know that more 
will be forthcoming if a favorable report is provided by the 
resident. Tipping is forbidden because it would disrupt the home's 
control structure. It would distort the staffs allocation of time 
among patients, favoring those with external resources; it also 
carries a potential for extortion from patients or their relatives.s 
Yet, incentive rewards can be managed so that they do not 
produce these undesired consequences (see, e.g., Sand and Berni, 
1974). For example, a sum could be allocated to each worker on 
the basis of his average rating by the patients. Also, the 
allocations could be made to groups, rather than to individuals, 
so that the workers would be motivated to cooperate with one 
another in providing for patient comfort. 
As an interested affiliate of a nursing home, a relatives' 
association can increase the sensitivity of the institution to the 
behavior of its staff. Home administrators recognize that many 
kin are concerned about patient welfare and collaborate with 
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relatives' associations to the benefit of the residents. Yet, the 
objectives of relatives are not identical with those of home 
administrators; a potential for conflict exists, for example, over 
issues such as when to transfer ill residents to a hospital and how 
much conformity with a home's routine should be expected of 
residents. In dealing with administrators, relatives are at a 
disadvantage because they usually lack information about events 
in the home. They are not in a position to evaluate the complaints 
brought by patients or to challenge the explanations offered by 
the institution. To be effective, relatives require a source of 
independent information about a home's daily operation. We 
suggest that this could be provided by a hired representative, 
whose task would be to listen to complaints, observe staff 
behavior, and report on these matters to the relatives' association. 
With access to such details, the affiliate could document the 
insensitivities of individual workers and, generally, intervene on 
behalf of patient interests. For this sort of arrangement to work, it 
is vital that the hired observer be responsible solely to the 
relatives' affiliate and that his assessments not be diluted by the 
facility's view of its problems and requirements. We are therefore 
skeptical about the capacity of ombudsmen (who are state 
employees) to effect changes in a home's operation which require 
continuous monitoring and the focused resolve that few but 
concerned relatives can provide. 
Each of the preceding approaches represents a different tactic 
for strengthening the hand of patients in their dealings with staff. 
In a well-governed home, the administrative structure can ensure 
adequate delivery of routine care; what remains problematic is 
the performance of tasks which cannot be scheduled and which 
must be carried out in response to patient requests. It is our view 
that the schemes we have enumerated complement one another, 
in that each permits staff behavior to be evaluated from a dif-
ferent perspective, though one in which the intention is to increase 
the influence of residents. We also favor a general strategy of 
redundancy in the mechanisms which protect patient interests 
because their great dependency upon staff leaves patients very 
vulnerable. 
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Organizational Design 
TYPES OF HOMES 
For the purpose of understanding some of the anxieties of 
elderly persons in relation to nursing homes, it is useful to 
broaden the range of institutions under discussion. Old age 
residences often are analyzed separately from nursing homes, yet 
in the minds of many aged individuals, the two sorts of facilities 
are not very different; sometimes homes of each type are even 
linked together organizationally. 
The reason why old age homes and nursing facilities are 
discussed separately is that, as social institutions, they differ in a 
number of significant respects. Old age residences are technically 
simpler; they require less capital investment, a lower level of 
medical skills, and utilize fewer workers. Patient needs in a 
nursing home are more extensive, and the complex licensing 
regulations of nursing facilities derive from this fact. Also, the 
source of income is different: Old age residences receive mainly 
private payments, while nursing homes obtain a major portion of 
their funds from third-party providers. For these reasons it makes 
sense to discuss the two institutions separately; each has its own 
sorts of problems and has developed a form of organization 
suitable to its objectives and financial environment. 
What is missed by this characterization is the fact that 
extensive patient flows occur between these types offacilities. Old 
age home residents are transferred to nursing homes if their 
condition deteriorates, perhaps with a hospital stay intervening. 
Conversely, individuals whose first residence in an institution for 
the elderly is a nursing facility may recover sufficiently to be 
moved to an old age home, though not to a point where they can 
return to a private residence. One difficulty posed by these flows is 
that the framework of residential institutions for the aged is not 
arranged in a way that is sensitive to the consequence of such 
moves for the social and emotional well-being of elderly individ-
uals. 
According to Scanlon et al. (1979: 61), in 1973, 72% of old age 
homes6 had fewer than 25 beds. The institutions which we 
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observed are much larger; each has separate rooms for about 150 
residents. Meals are served in a dining room, which is not unlike a 
comparable facility in a hotel. Some recreation activities are 
scheduled each week by the homes; beyond this, the residents 
have abundant time for conversation and leisurely contact. Yet, 
in our observations, and according to others (e.g., Riley and 
Foner, 1968: 587), the density of social interaction in an old age 
home is low. To some extent, this is attributable to the 
impairment of mental capacities in this population. However, 
social distancing also appears to arise from the high rate of 
unscheduled departures from a home. 
Sudden death is not an unfamiliar event in this age group, so 
one is hardly stunned to learn at breakfast that a coresident 
passed away during the night. Yet, incapacitating illness is far 
more common and one may hear each week about several 
neighbors who have been removed to a hospital or a nursing 
home. While many of the departers recover, or at least stabilize at 
some higher level of infirmity (e.g., an inability to walk), they 
rarely return to the old age home they left, especially if the 
institution is well regarded and has a waiting list. One reason is 
that full payment for room and meals is required to keep a room 
available, and this can be financially prohibitive if the recovery 
period extends over several months. An equally consequential 
reason is that old age homes will not admit individuals who are 
even mildly incapacitated; applicants must be able to dress and 
care for themselves. Most homes will not accept a person who 
requires a wheelchair or even permit a resident who deteriorates 
to this level to remain. 
The above remarks were intended to describe an environment 
in which one's friends and acquaintances are prone to disappear 
suddenly. The psychological adjustment made by many elderly 
persons to this situation is to avoid establishing close friendships 
since, all too frequently, the consequence of intimacy is the pain 
of loss. Partly for this reason, old age homes appear to an 
observer to be places characterized by high levels of social 
isolation-while close physically, the residents are very separate 
emotionally. 
Even more anxiety-provoking than the fear of loss of friends 
and acquaintances is the prospect of becoming ill oneself. Because 
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transfer to a hospital or a nursing home carries a significant 
probability of not returning, one's familiar surroundings and 
social environment are threatened. Illness not only means 
physical pain and mortal danger but also can be cause for 
"expulsion." If one's ability to walk becomes impaired even 
slightly, this can generate great psychological distress. An 
unsteady gait is visible to staff and to other residents, and all 
know that further deterioration may require the individual to 
leave. 
As a result, the organizational and physical division of 
institutions for the elderly into old age homes and nursing 
facilities is a cause of anxiety for elderly persons as it requires 
moves that are disruptive of social linkages. The different costs of 
entry into the two markets, the different organizational arrange-
ments and sources of payment, make the tendency to specialize in 
one or the other type of facility an understandable decision. Some 
authors (e.g., Penchansky and Taubenhaus, 1965) have even 
recommended more extensive differentiation among homes, on 
the grounds that programs and resources could thereby be 
effectively targeted to the specific needs of residents in each 
facility. 
One way to retain the advantages of specialization and yet 
reduce the trauma produced by the present organizational 
structure would be to promote the building of large institutions 
which have the scale to include both a sheltered residence and the 
two categories of nursing home care. An alternate approach 
would be to encourage vendors of smaller facilities, which 
provide complementary sorts of care for the aged, to locate on 
adjacent sites. Such arrangements (which could be promoted 
through tax incentives) would permit elderly individuals to 
continue living in the same social context as they pass through the 
stages of later life. 
CATEGORIES OF PA TIENTS; 
CA TEGORIES OF WORKERS 
The division of patients in a nursing home into categories is an 
organizational arrangement intended to foster economic efficien-
cies (Vladeck, 1980: 135). Categorization permits administrators 
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to assign staff and target other resources in accordance with the 
diverse needs of the resident population. Within a category, 
services tend to be geared to the average level of disability 
(Penchansky and Taubenhaus, 1965: 593-595). The types of 
assistance required by only a few residents may be too rare to 
warrant the institution of routine care procedures; rather, such 
services would be provided in response to individual requests, to 
the extent that staff time permits. However, categorization has 
the potential for increasing a home's ability to respond effectively 
to rare needs, since, if the groupings are made homogeneous in 
terms of disability level, many patient requests would no longer 
reflect the requirements of a minority and could justify the 
introduction of routine procedures. 7 
Following this reasoning, the greater the number of categories, 
the more homogeneous the residents in a group, and the more 
finely services could be tailored to their needs. Both economic 
efficiency and responsiveness would be served. However, elabo-
rate categorization has costs. With respect to efficiency, the 
empty beds in one resident category could not be filled from an 
overflow of patients appropriate to another division. With regard 
to patient welfare, because an individual's disability level is not a 
stable attribute, the use of multiple categories would require 
considerable movement of patients, if relatively homogeneous 
residence groups are to be maintained. Even when such shifts 
occur within a single institution, they can be disruptive of the 
precarious social life of elderly persons. As a consequence, we 
would recommend against instituting more categories than the 
two broad ones in current use. 
A different approach to categorization emphasizes the speciali-
zation of workers. The economic benefits of a division of labor 
are, of course, well understood, and all complex organizations 
utilize this principle. What is less well appreciated is the use of 
specialization as a tactic for administrative control over staff 
activities. Where workers have multiple responsibilities and 
where many of the tasks are nonroutine, not controlled by 
schedules, they have considerable discretion in deciding how to 
allocate their time. Indeed, as we have argued, it is precisely this 
discretion which creates staff power over residents and permits 
workers to ignore many requests for service. However, specializa-
tion can be used to ensure that each ofthe various responsibilities 
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of the staff receives its proper emphasis. In particular, complex 
chores could be subdivided into component tasks, and each 
assigned a number of workers that reflects the home's view of its 
importance. A narrowing of responsibility would reduce worker 
discretion and enhance the ability of home administrators to hold 
staff acountable for the performance of specific jobs. 
The cost of coordination is the price associated with a division 
of labor. The advantages of specialization, therefore, are limited 
to chores which either require mUltiple skills or which do not have 
to be performed at a single time with the same patient. Where this 
is not the case and specialization would create coordination 
problems, a better alternative would be to devise a complex 
reward structure which is sensitive to the performance of each 
component task or a reward strucutre which incorporates the 
evaluations of residents. (In supplying ratings, residents would be 
implicitly aggregating the mUltiple areas of staff responsibility.) 
The latter approaches to control over staff were outlined in the 
preceding section; they are probably the preferred arrangements 
for providing most of the health and personal care services 
required by nursing home patients. 
Yet, there are tasks which could be separated from the mUltiple 
responsibilities of nurses' aides and attendants and which are 
often neglected in the press of competing work demands. A 
prominent example concerns staff obligations with respect to 
physical rehabilitation.8 The tasks in this area are sufficiently 
distinct from personal care chores that assigning them to different 
personnel would not create coordination problems. One advan-
tage of separation is that, as we have indicated, it would give 
home administrators greater control over the performance of 
diverse jobs. As a second benefit, it would permit a nursing home 
to acquaint different categories of workers with different norms 
and reward them according to standards of performance appro-
priate to their narrow areas of responsibility. In particular, it may 
be unreasonable to hold personal care workers accountable for 
patient improvement, since the bulk of their time is occupied with 
patient maintenance. The situation would be different, however, 
for staff whose primary responsibility is to exercise residents and 
assist in their rehabilitation; workers with this specialization 
could be trained to expect patient improvement and rewarded on 
the basis of patient progress. 
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Implications for Policy 
The better nursing homes for the aged are nonprofit institu-
tions, often sponsored by religious associations. The physical 
plant may be attractive, and the administrators and senior staff 
are committed to providing a humane environment for the 
elderly, infirm persons. Nonetheless, these intentions frequently 
are not translated successfully into practice. Although residents 
come to the homes to live out their lives with some modicum of 
pleasure and comfort, not to recover from illness, it is as social 
settings that nursing homes are especially problematic. The lives 
of residents are regimented; they are dependent upon staff 
schedules for assistance with personal needs and they retain little 
control over how the time in a day will be spent. 
In this article our objective was to explore some of the 
organizational factors that are responsible for the poor quality of 
life in many nursing homes. We have concentrated on issues 
which involve the notions of reward structure and categorization 
(or specialization) because these considerations have received 
much attention in the formulation of governmental policy and 
because we concur that arrangements on these matters carry great 
importance for patient welfare. Governmental interest in organi-
zational issues stems from a concern about controlling the 
escalating costs of nursing home care and from a desire to 
influence the allocation of resources among patients with differ-
ent levels of need. Yet, the consequences of the arrangements that 
have been adopted are detrimental to the quality of life of elderly 
persons. 
It is our contention that every reward structure has built-in 
inducements for behaviors that are dysfunctional from the point 
of view of policy makers. These distortions of intent are a natural 
consequence of an attempt to guide behavior in a complex 
institution through the use of a few simple rules to determine a 
home's income. Analogous difficulties within a nursing home, 
concerning staff performance, can also be understood in terms of 
inadequacies of a reward structure. Here the problem was 
diagnosed as a situation in which personal care workers have 
mUltiple responsibilities while residents lack the power to influ-
ence staff use of time. In some institutions, supervision and the 
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reward structure can be augmented with the control effects of 
socialization. However, a dependence upon value internalization 
requires workers who are empathetic to the needs of the elderly 
and, because oflocation, many nursing homes cannot recruit low-
skilled personnel who are responsive to value training. 
In line with this analysis, our inclination is not to conclude by 
proposing yet another reimbursement scheme for homes or 
reward structure for staff. Improvements certainly can be devised 
(e.g., Kane and Kane, 1978; Sand and Berni, 1974) and we have 
suggested some innovations in this article. However, our princi-
pal conclusion is that, because of the complexity of patient needs, 
no single control structure is likely to be adequate for ensuring 
patient welfare. Patients will fare best where many concerned 
groups are active, each monitoring the operation of a home from 
the vantage of its own perspective. In the private sector, reward 
structures effectively control staff performance because changes 
in patronization provide feedback to a firm, and the parameters 
of the reward structure can be adjusted accordingly. A compar-
able feedback mechanism does not exist in nursing homes, but we 
suggest that this same function could be served by the presence of 
mUltiple evaluation structures, each focusing upon patient wel-
fare from its own special viewpoint. In this situation, the 
insensitiveness of existing control arrangements would be moder-
ated by the reactions of particular constituencies to behaviors 
that fall within their domains. State governments can play a 
supportive role in this endeavor, in addition to their licensing and 
inspection programs, by legitimating the right of concerned 
groups (of relatives, elderly persons in the community, and 
others) to gain access to nursing homes as observers. 
From a different perspective, a central problem faced by 
nursing homes concerns the delivery of nonroutine services in a 
manner that is responsive to patient wishes. Nursing homes 
achieve economies by routinizing the provision of care, and there 
consequently is a tendency to force many patient needs into a 
framework of routine, even when they cannot be adequately 
accommodated in this way. One strategy for increasing respon-
siveness involves the categorization of patients or staff. This sort 
of solution promises to restructure the distribution of patient 
needs, or reorganize the delivery of services, in ways that heighten 
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staff responsiveness as well as promote efficiency. The advantages 
and limitations of these approaches were discussed in the article. 
A second strategy would focus solely on arrangements to enhance 
responsiveness, in the view that pressures for efficiency are 
already powerful and one must bolster a home's commitment to 
meeting the idiosyncratic needs of patients. Attempts to increase 
patient influence in the reward structure for staff, and strategies 
for bringing the operation of nursing homes under the observa-
tion of concerned groups, represent solutions of the latter sort; 
they are not intended to contribute to efficiency. A still different 
approach, suggested by Litwak (1977), would make use of the 
special suitability of primary group members for meeting the 
nonroutine needs of residents. However, because primary group 
members often are not available, we have concentrated in this 
article on bureaucratic arrangements. 
NOTES 
I. Norms are usually set for classes of nursing homes (e.g., in New York State, size, 
location, and quality affect the reimbursement rate), and homes within a category can bill 
no more than a certain percentage of their group average (e.g., 110%). Such payment 
determination tends to be insensitive to a facility's actual expenses and forces all homes in 
a category to have similar reimbursement rates. 
2. Hospitals and doctors face an analogous dilemma in deciding when to discontinue 
the use of expensive life-sustaining equipment by a comatose patient. The situation we 
describe is somewhat different in that there is no question of brain death at the time 
support is curtailed. Further, hospital patients have legal rights in a decision to withdraw 
support whereas the interests of nursing home patients are not represented in resource 
allocation decisions. 
Yet, as N. Rango has reminded us, the case of a patient who requires intensive nursing 
services has little prospect for recovery of function raises terrible ethical issues. It is a 
problem that we will eventually have to confront, because societal resources are lim ted and 
because the percentage of the U. S. population in the 0Ider-than-75 age group will increase 
substantially in the present decade. 
3. In extreme cases of staff alienation, patients may be treated virtuaJly as objects. 
They will be dressed without being asked which clothes they wish to wear; they wiJl be 
taken to social activities or for personal services (e.g., hairdressing) without being 
consulted or informed about the destination. Thus, not only is control lost over the 
rudiments of their Jives but also residents may be cut off from information concerning 
what is happening to them. 
4. The evaluations would have to be coJlected in a manner that maintains patient 
confidentiality in order to protect residents from pressure or retaliation by personal care 
workers. 
5. Even though nursing homes are properly sensitive to the disruptive effects of 
tipping and bribery, administrators encourage a version of this practice. When beds are 
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scarce a home may require a "contribution" from a prospective patient's family to secure 
admission. 
6. The precise category is "Personal care and domiciliary care facilities." 
7. One example relates to recreational activities. The better nursing homes have game 
rooms and schedule concerts and other events each week in a central auditorium. A 
question, however, concerns how residents get to the activities. In the homes we observed, 
a crucial consideration was the ability of a patient to propel his wheelchair along corridors. 
Where patients had this faculty, they were in a position to enjoy the recreational program 
of the home. However, patients who lacked the necessary arm strength were dependent 
upon the staff to transport them, and this was rarely done. Because most of the residents 
were bedridden, the routines instituted by the home were geared to patients in this 
condition, and the staff sought to simplify their own chores by treating all incapacitated 
residents as requiring, essentially, the same service routine. 
8. While many nursing homes have rehabilitation professionals on staff who work 
with residents a few times each week, it is also necessary that the residents exercise daily to 
build muscle strength. Assistance with these simple exercises is supposed to be given by 
personal care workers. However, the assistance often is not provided. Unlike feeding and 
washing patients, or changing linen, there are few overt signs that can indicate to a 
supervisor whether a patient has been properly exercised. 
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